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MEASURING THE THREAT: A PROPOSAL FOR A 
NEW DETAINEE VITIATION STANDARD
BENJAMIN B. GLERUM*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Americans have come to accept the detention of  foreign terrorist suspects as a necessary by-
product of  the Nation’s ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations (“OCO”).  What most Ameri-
cans do not think about, however, are the criteria necessary to determine both whom to detain and 
for how long.  In Boumediene v. Bush,1 the U.S. Supreme Court afforded the U.S. District Court for 
the District of  Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) the complete authority to answer these fundamen-
tal questions.2  In doing so, the Court itself  missed an opportunity to outline procedural rules for 
detention trials, and instead, permitted the D.C. District Court to establish these critically important 
guidelines.3  However, despite this opportunity to set the procedural contours for detention cases, 
the D.C. District Court, and later the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the District of  Columbia (“D.C. Cir-
cuit Court”), have issued sometimes inconsistent rulings that paint a confusing picture of  how these 
cases should proceed.4
One critical question of  U.S. detention policy has been met with diverse judicial interpretations 
at the D.C. District Court: once the government establishes that a detainee’s relationship with a ter-
rorist organization existed, can that relationship ever be vitiated5?  In other words, if  someone satis-
* Executive Editor, American University National Security Law Brief; J.D. Candidate, American University, Washington College of  
Law, May 2012; B.A. History, 2006, Trinity College (CT).
1  553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2  Id. at 796 (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of  the . . . issues that will arise during the course of  the detainees’ 
habeas corpus proceedings.”); id. at 798 (“The cases are remanded to the Court of  Appeals with instructions that it 
remand the cases to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
3  See generally id. at 796 (“These and the other remaining questions are within the expertise and competence of  the 
'LVWULFW&RXUWWRDGGUHVVLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFHµBaher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law 
of  Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 481 (2010) (suggesting that Boumediene failed to empower executive action to imprison a 
person because it did not establish concrete procedures as a guide for future review).
4  See Colin C. Pogge, A Dissentious “Debate”: Shaping Habeas Procedures Post-Boumediene, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097 
(2010) (describing how the current state of  Guantanamo jurisprudence in the D.C. District Court “breeds uncertainty 
DQGVNHSWLFLVPµDQG´SHUVRQLÀHVDFRXUWLQGLVDJUHHPHQWDERXWWKHZD\LQZKLFKVXVSHFWHGWHUURULVWVDUHWUHDWHGLQRXU
legal system, a disagreement in need of  a resolution”).
5 ´9LWLDWHµLVGHÀQHGDV´WRPDNHYRLGRUYRLGDEOHµBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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ÀHVWKHFULWHULDIRUGHWHQWLRQDVDQHQHP\FRPEDWDQWGRHVWKDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQVHUYHDVDQLQGHOLEOH
scarlet letter?  Or can that relationship be vitiated by changed circumstances or time? This Article 
ZLOODUJXHWKDWIROORZLQJWKHVWDWXWRU\IRXQGDWLRQRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWDQGDFFHSWHGWHQHWVRI WKH
laws of  war, such a determination does not serve as a scarlet letter justifying continued detention.  
Instead, the United States must take into account the current threat of  the individual to justify fur-
ther detention.  Part II of  this Article will summarize the current scope of  U.S. detention power as 
interpreted by the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts, and will synthesize recent caselaw to deter-
mine the current standard for vitiation.  Next, Part III will argue that the current vitiation standard 
is inconsistent with governing law, and will recommend a standard that considers the current threat 
the detainee poses to the United States.  Finally, Part III will also recommend that Congress establish 
this standard.
II.  BACKGROUND
A.   Development of  the Current Standard
1.  Controlling Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court has issued three opinions exploring how OCO detainees can challenge their 
detention.6  These decisions established much of  the general procedures followed today in detention 
proceedings, but they have also left many critical questions unanswered.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld7 and Rasul v. Bush,8ERWKGHFLGHGLQZHUHWKHÀUVWFDVHVUHODWHGWRKRZGH-
tainees can challenge their detention.  In Hamdi, the Court commented that both Congress and the 
&RXUWUHOLHGRQKLVWRULFDO´ODZRIZDUSULQFLSOHVµZKHQDQDO\]LQJVLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKLQGHÀQLWHGH-
tention has been authorized.9  The Court held that when the United States detains citizens as enemy 
FRPEDWDQWVWKHJRYHUQPHQWPXVWLQIRUPWKHFLWL]HQGHWDLQHHRI ´WKHIDFWXDOEDVLVIRUKLVFODVVLÀFD-
tion” and permit the citizen detainee to challenge the government’s case before an impartial court.10
In RasulWKH&RXUWKHOGWKDWGHWDLQHHVFRQÀQHGDWWKH1DYDO6WDWLRQ*XDQWDQDPR%D\KDYHWKHULJKW
to petition the D.C. District Court to contest their detention under the habeas corpus statute.11
In Boumediene, the Court held that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas 
6  See, e.g.,+DPGLY5XPVIHOG86DQQRXQFLQJ´WKDWLQGHÀQLWHGHWHQWLRQIRUWKHSXUSRVHRI 
interrogation is not authorized”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (framing the issue as “whether the habeas 
statute confers a right to judicial review of  the legality of  executive detention of  aliens in a territory over which the 
United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction . . .”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (ruling that to deny the writ of  
habeas corpus, Congress must utilize the Suspension Clause).     
7  542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8  542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
10  Id. at 533.
11  See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (interpreting the law as providing the Court jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus review) 
(referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (“The writ of  habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in 
custody under or by color of  the authority of  the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof  . . . 
.”)). 
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relief, one that Congress cannot eliminate unless habeas is suspended or adequate alternative proce-
dures are established.12  The Court found that no such adequate alternative procedure existed,13 and 
held that the D.C. District Court would hear all Guantanamo habeas detention petitions.14  In doing 
so, the Court left the procedural and substantive standards open for lower courts to determine via 
the common law process.15  With this holding, the Court sought to balance the competing principles 
of  proper deference to the Executive on matters of  national security16 and the need for the Judiciary 
to settle “challenges to the authority of  the Executive to imprison a person.”17  However, the Court 
UHIUDLQHGIURPDIÀUPDWLYHO\VHWWLQJDQ\VWDQGDUGVE\ZKLFKWKH'&'LVWULFW&RXUWZRXOGGHFLGHKD-
beas petitions, emphasizing that the “opinion [did] not address the content of  the law that governs 
petitioners’ detention . . . [as the law was] yet to be determined.”18  Thus, when given a prime op-
portunity to set the standards governing the limits of  the Executive’s detention authority, the Court 
declined, and left open critical questions of  U.S. detention policy.19
B. Current Scope of  Detention Authority
%HIRUHDGGUHVVLQJWKHVSHFLÀFLVVXHRI YLWLDWLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRÀUVWHVWDEOLVKWKHFXUUHQW
scope of  U.S. detention authority, both as expressed by the Obama administration and as interpreted 
by the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts.
1. Obama Administration Position and Statutory Foundation
Soon after President Obama was elected, his administration indicated that it would seek to 
clarify the scope of  U.S. detention power and direct Congress to establish standards for detention 
prosecutions.20  The administration has, however, supported the Boumediene framework of  allowing 
12  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.     
13  Id.DWÀQGLQJWKHDTA review process to be a facially inadequate replacement for habeas corpus).
14  Id.DW´,ILQDIXWXUHFDVHDGHWDLQHHÀOHVDKDEHDVSHWLWLRQLQDQRWKHUMXGLFLDOGLVWULFWLQZKLFKDSURSHU
respondent can be served . . . the [g]overnment can move for change of  venue to the . . . United States District Court for 
the District of  Columbia.”).
15  See Azmy, supra note 3, at 514 (commenting that the Court has left it up to the lower courts to resolve “factual 
disputes or mixed questions”).
16  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796–97 (attempting to reconcile the competing purposes of  the Judiciary to uphold the 
Executive’s judgments on national security and to protect one’s personal liberty to be free from restraints). 
17  Id.
18  Id. at 798; see Azmy, supra note 3, at 514 (commenting that the Court has left it up to the lower courts to resolve 
“factual disputes or mixed questions”).
19 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Remarkably, despite the years that have passed since 
WKHVHKDEHDVFRUSXVSHWLWLRQVZHUHÀOHGWKHVWDWHRI WKHODZUHJDUGLQJWKHVFRSHRI WKH3UHVLGHQW·VDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQ
the petitioners remains unsettled.”); Benjamin Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of  Detention:  The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as 
Lawmaking, THE BROOKINGS INST., Jan. 22, 2010  (noting that in Boumediene, the Court “declined to address a number of  
FULWLFDOTXHVWLRQVWKDWGHÀQHWKHFRQWRXUVRI DQ\QRQFULPLQDOGHWHQWLRQV\VWHPµ
20  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009) 
(“We must have clear, defensible and lawful standards for those [who we cannot prosecute even though they are a danger 
to the United States].”).  
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the D.C. District Court to develop habeas litigation standards via the common law process.21  The 
administration’s position “means that for good or ill, these rules will be written by judges through 
the common-law process of  litigating the habeas corpus cases of  the . . . detainees still held at 
Guantanamo.”22  In addition, the administration claims that it has the authority to detain not only 
members of  al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, but also those who “substantially support” those 
groups.23  The administration cites the Authorization for Use of  Military Force (“AUMF”)24 as its 
VWDWXWRU\MXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKLVDXWKRULW\25
The Obama administration’s assertion of  detention authority represents a more modest ap-
proach than that of  the Bush administration in two ways.  First, the Bush administration asserted au-
thority to detain not only members of  al Qaeda, but also its “associated forces.”26  This rather wide 
scope of  asserted authority is evident in former President Bush’s statement before a joint session of  
Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he said “[o]ur enemy is a radical network of  terrorists, 
and every government that supports them.  Our war begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  
It will not end until every terrorist group of  global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”27
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Bush administration based its authority to detain alleged 
terrorists not only on the AUMF, like the Obama administration, but also on the inherent author-
ity imbued in the Executive by Article II of  the U.S. Constitution.28  The Obama administration has 
21  Peter Baker, Obama to Use Current Law to Support Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009.
22  Wittes, supra note 19, at 4.
23  See Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The President also has the authority to detain 
persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or Al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners . . . .”). 
24  Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
25  See John R. Crook, State Department Legal Advisor Explains U.S. Approach to International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 271, 
275 (2010) (quoting State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh as stating that the administration’s detention authority 
relies on “legislative authority expressly granted to the President in the 2001 AUMF”); Baker, supra note 21 (“Instead, the 
administration will continue to hold the detainees without bringing them to trial based on the power it says it has under 
the Congressional resolution passed after the attacks of  Sept. 11, 2001, authorizing the [P]resident to use force against 
forces of  Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”).   
26  See Wittes, supra note 19, at 16 (“The Bush administration asserted  . . . [that it had] the power to detain for the 
duration of  hostilities both members and supported of  entities—including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ‘associated 
forces.’”).
27  President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of  Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001); see
David Mortlock, 'HÀQLWH'HWHQWLRQ7KH6FRSHRI WKH3UHVLGHQW·V$XWKRULW\WR'HWDLQ(QHP\&RPEDWDQWV, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
375, 387 (2010) (quoting Bush administration counsel as asserting authority to detain a “little old lady in Switzerland 
ZKRZULWHVFKHFNVWRZKDWVKHWKLQNVLVDFKDULW\WKDWKHOSVRUSKDQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQEXW>ZKDW@UHDOO\LVDIURQWWRÀQDQFH
al-Qaeda activities, a person who teaches English to the son of  an al Qaeda member, and a journalist who knows the 
location of  Osama bin laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source”).
28  See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 378 (noting that “[t]he Bush administration repeatedly argued that its authority to 
detain arose not only from the AUMF, but also from the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief  under Article II 
of  the Constitution”).
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explicitly chosen not to base its claim for detention authority on such Article II powers.29
Given that the AUMF is the only statutory authority cited by the Obama administration, analysis 
of  the statute is critical to a discussion of  the government’s detention power.  The AUMF is concise 
and direct.  The preamble provides the legal foundation of  the statute, namely that the President has 
the constitutional authority to deter and prevent future acts of  international terrorism against the 
United States.30  The statute then provides:
[T]he [P]resident is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such or-
ganizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of  international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.31
When he signed the resolution into law on September 18, 2001, President Bush underscored the 
preventative nature of  the authorization.32
Analysis of  the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) is also instructive in this context, as it 
SURYLGHVGHÀQLWLRQVRI WHUPVXVHGLQFDVHVGLVFXVVHGWKURXJKRXWWKLV$UWLFOH33  The purpose of  the 
MCA (both the original 2006 Act and its amendments in 2009), in general, is to “authorize trial by 
military commission for violations of  the law of  war, and for other purposes.”34  However, given 
that military commissions and the post-Boumediene common law process deal with similar legal ques-
tions and concepts, it is helpful to analyze whom Congress believed the administration could try in 
military commissions, outside of  the normal civilian courts.  Courts today still cite to the 2006 MCA 
when discussing the scope of  U.S. detention authority.35
7KH0&$DQGWKHDPHQGPHQWVGHÀQHWKRVHZKRIDOOXQGHUWKHVFRSHRI WKHDG-
29  See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Under the Bush administration, the government 
had repeatedly asserted that it could detain individuals pursuant to the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief  
under Article II, § 2, clause 1 of  the Constitution . . . .”).   
30  AUMF at pmble. 
31  Id.
 3UHVV5HOHDVH:KLWH+RXVH2IÀFHRI WKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\3UHVLGHQW6LJQV$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 0LOLWDU\)RUFH
Bill (Sept. 18, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/print/20010918-10.html. 
33  See generally Military Commissions Act of  2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter “2006 
MCA”]; Military Commissions Act of  2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) [hereinafter “2009 
MCA”]. 
34  2006 MCA pmbl.
35  See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 2006 MCA sec. 3, § 948a(1)) (“Congress, in 
WKH0&$SURYLGHGJXLGDQFHRQWKHFODVVRI SHUVRQVVXEMHFWWRGHWHQWLRQXQGHUWKH$80)E\GHÀQLQJXQODZIXO
enemy combatants who can be tried by a military commission.”).
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ministration’s military commission structure in similar ways.367KH0&$GHÀQHGDQXQODZIXO
HQHP\FRPEDWDQWWKHQWKHJHQHUDOGHÀQLWLRQRI DWHUURULVWZKRWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDVDXWKRUL]HGWR
detain) as “a person who has . . . purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United 
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant . . . .”37  While the 2009 MCA 
amendments abandoned the term “unlawful enemy combatant” altogether, and instead described the 
type of  person under MCA jurisdiction as an “unprivileged enemy belligerent,”38WKHGHÀQLWLRQRI 
unprivileged enemy belligerent used language nearly identical to that of  “unlawful enemy combat-
DQWµ7KHDPHQGPHQWV·GHÀQLWLRQFRYHUHGLQGLYLGXDOVZKRKDYH´HQJDJHGLQKRVWLOLWLHVDJDLQVW
the United States or its coalition partners,” who either “purposefully and materially supported hos-
tilities against the United States or its coalition partners” or “[were] part of  al Qaeda at the time of  
the alleged offense under this chapter.”39
2. Judicial Interpretation of  the Obama Position
The Obama administration explicitly envisioned that the Judiciary would determine, on a case-
by-case basis, what constitutes the level and type of  “substantial support” required for detention.40
The courts initially accepted the administration’s assertion of  detention authority.  In Gherebi v. 
Obama,41 D.C. District Court Judge Walton agreed with the administration’s claim that the AUMF 
SURYLGHGDVXIÀFLHQWMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUGHWHQWLRQ42 and adopted “the basic framework advanced by the 
government for determining whether an individual is subject to that authority.”43  However, Judge 
:DOWRQTXDOLÀHG44 the substantial support standard, interpreting it to include only individuals who 
36  Compare0&$DLGHÀQLQJDQ´XQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWµDV´DSHUVRQZKRKDVSXUSRVHIXOO\
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant 
(including a person who is part of  the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)”), with 2009 MCA § 948a(7)(a)–(c) 
(conferring jurisdiction over those who have “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners . . . 
[have] purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” or “[were] part 
of  al Qaeda at the time of  the alleged offense under this chapter”).
37  2006 MCA § 948a(1)(i).
38  2009 MCA § 948a(7).
39  Id. § 948a(7)(a)–(c).
40  See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Memo for the Government at 1–2, Gherebi 
v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009)) (“However, the government believes that ‘[i]t is neither possible nor 
advisable . . . to attempt to identify[] in the abstract[] the precise nature and degree of  ‘substantial support,’ or the precise 
characteristics of  ‘associated forces.’. . . . Instead, it opines that ‘the contours of  the ‘substantial support’ and ‘associated 
forces’ bases of  detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.’”).
41  609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
42  See id. at 54 (“For the reasons explained at length below, the Court agrees with the government that the AUMF 
functions as an independent basis in domestic law for the President’s asserted detention authority . . . .”).
43  Id.
44  See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 390–91 (stating that the court “did not reject outright the government’s ‘substantial 
VXSSRUW·VWDQGDUGµEXWVLPSO\´OLPLW>HG@LWVDSSOLFDWLRQWRGHWDLQHHVZKRÀWKLVFULWHULDIRUPHPEHUVKLSLQWKHKLHUDUFK\
of  enemy organizations”).
95NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 2, No. 1
were “effectively” part of  enemy terrorist armed forces.45  In this regard, Judge Walton’s interpreta-
tion is similar to certain elements of  the 2009 MCA: those subject to the administration’s detention 
power must have “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” and have 
been “part of  al Qaeda at the time of  the alleged offense under this chapter.”46  Judge Walton’s 
framework has since been applied by D.C. District Court judges in Mohammed v. Obama47 and Al-
Adahi v. Obama.48
In Hamlily v. Obama,49 D.C. District Court Judge Bates adopted a narrower approach. Judge Bates 
outright rejected the “substantial support” standard,50 and instead held that the key inquiry in any 
habeas challenge was whether the individual was part of  al Qaeda in that he or she “function[ed] or 
participate[d] within or under the command structure of  the organization.”51  In determining wheth-
HUVRPHRQHVDWLVÀHVWKLVWHVWVRPHOHYHORI ´NQRZOHGJHRULQWHQWLVUHTXLUHGµ52  This requirement 
emphasizes the “functionality” of  Judge Bates’ test.  An individual is not detainable by the United 
States if  he or she is unwittingly part of  a terrorist group; the individual actually has to functionally 
serve that group in some capacity.  In elucidating this test, Judge Bates directly hearkened back to the 
Bush administration’s claim of  authority to detain “associated forces,”53 and agreed that detention of  
VXFK´DVVRFLDWHGIRUFHVµZDVMXVWLÀHGDFFRUGLQJWRKLVPRGHO54  Therefore, although Judge Bates de-
clined to set an actual bright line standard,55 he offered a framework stipulating that detainees need 
be a co-belligerent to have been part of  a terrorist group56 to justify detention.  The D.C. District 
45  See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“In other words, the Court interprets the government’s ‘substantial support’ 
standard to mean individuals who were members of  the ‘armed forces’ of  an enemy organization at the time of  their 
initial detention.”).
46  2009 MCA §948a(7)(a)–(c).
47  704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4  (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that “Judge Walton’s opinion presented a clearer approach, and 
therefore [adopting] his reasoning and conclusion”). 
48  No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (noting that “[w]hile the Court has great regard for 
the scholarship and analysis contained in both decisions, the Court concludes that Judge Walton’s opinion presented a 
clearer approach, and therefore will adopt his reasoning and conclusion”).
49  616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
50  See id. at 69 (holding that “detention based on substantial or direct support for the Taliban, al Qaeda or associated 
forces, without more, is simply not warranted by domestic law or the law of  war”).
51  Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
52  Id.
53  See Wittes, supra note 19, at 16 (“The Bush administration asserted  . . . [that it had] the power to detain for the 
duration of  hostilities both members and supporters of  entities—including [a]l Qaeda, the Taliban, and ‘associated 
forces’ . . . .”).
54  Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (stating that “[t]he authority also reaches those who were members of  ‘associated 
forces’ which the Court interprets to mean ‘co-belligerents’ . . .”).
55  Id. at 75 (“With respect to the criteria to be used in determining whether someone was ‘part of ’ the ‘Taliban or al 
Qaida or associated forces,’ the Court will not attempt to set forth an exhaustive list because such determinations must 
be made on an individualized basis.”). 
56  See id. (“Accordingly the government has the authority to detain members of  ‘associated forces’ as long as those 
forces would be considered co-belligerents . . . .”).  The court also emphasized that “some level of  knowledge or intent” 
WREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWHUURULVWJURXSZDVUHTXLUHGIRUMXVWLÀHGGHWHQWLRQId.
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Court has since applied the Hamlily approach in a number of  cases.57
Comparing the Hamlily and Gherebi tests is instructive, as the difference between the two, while 
DSSHDULQJWREHJUHDWDWÀUVWLVHVVHQWLDOO\RQHRI VHPDQWLFV:KLOH-XGJH:DOWRQDFFHSWHGWKH
“substantial support” standard by qualifying it to mean something that the administration may or 
may not agree with,58 Judge Bates rejected the test while describing a standard that is not dissimilar 
to that used by Judge Walton.59  Judge Bates even cited Judge Walton’s Gherebi opinion in describing 
ZKDWVDWLVÀHGWKH´IXQFWLRQDOLW\µUHTXLUHPHQWRI KLVWHVW60  So, while Judge Bates rejected the sub-
stantial support standard in a literal sense,61DQGGHVFULEHGWKLVDVWKHGHÀQLQJGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQKH
and Judge Walton,62HYHQ-XGJH%DWHVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW´DVDSSOLHGLQVSHFLÀFFDVHVWKLVGLIIHUHQFH
should not be great.”63
The current law controlling the scope of  the administration’s detention power, however, is found 
in a recent D.C. Circuit Court opinion, Al-Bihani v. Obama.64  Writing for the D.C. Circuit Court, 
Judge Brown departed from Hamlily and its progeny, and accepted that substantially supporting a 
terrorist group canEHVXIÀFLHQWJURXQGVIRUGHWHQWLRQVRORQJDVWKHGHWDLQHHLV´SDUWRI µDO4D-
eda in that he “purposefully and materially support[ed] . . .  hostilities against the U.S. [or c]oalition 
57  See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that, “accordingly, as Judge Bates ruled in 
Hamlily . . . the U.S. may detain “those who are ‘part of  the ‘Taliban or al Qaida forces’ . . .”); Anam v. Obama, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2010).(applying Hamlily standard); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting 
that the court has “adopted Judge Bates’ approach [in Hamlily]”), aff ’d 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Muitari v. United 
States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the “the Court shall adopt the reasoning set forth in Judge 
John D. Bates’s decision in Hamlily . . .”).
58  See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (interpreting the “substantial support” standard 
“to mean individuals who were members of  the ‘armed forces’ of  an enemy organization at the time of  their initial 
detention”).
59  See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (“Accordingly the government has the authority to detain members of  ‘associated 
forces’ as long as those forces would be considered co-belligerents . . . .”).  
60  See id. (citing Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69) (noting, after describing the test, that “as Gherebi observed, [the 
IXQFWLRQDOLW\WHVWFRXOGEHVDWLVÀHGE\@DQLQGLYLGXDO¶WDVNHGZLWKKRXVLQJIHHGLQJRUWUDQVSRUWLQJDO4DHGDÀJKWHUV
EXWDQDO4DHGDGRFWRURUFOHULFRUWKHIDWKHURI DQDO4DHGDÀJKWHUZKRVKHOWHUVKLVVRQRXWRI IDPLOLDOOR\DOW\>LVQRW
likely detainable] assuming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of  command’. . .”).
61  See id. at 76 (“Hence, the government’s reliance on ‘substantial support’ as a basis for detention independent of  
membership in the Taliban, al Qaeda or an associated force is rejected.”).
62  Id. (“This represents a difference between this Court’s approach and that of  Judge Walton in Gherebi.”).
63  Id.; see Mortlock, supra note 27, at 391 (noting that “[d]espite the apparently different treatment of  ‘substantial 
support,’ the decisions in Gherebi and Hamlily are functionally the same . . . [t]hey agree that only members of  an enemy 
force may be detained, and that the level of  support from one particular individual can be used to determine whether 
that individual falls into the hierarchical structure of  an organization”).
64  590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Petitioners moved for the D.C. Circuit Court 
to review the case to clarify whether certain statements relating to the controlling nature of  international law were 
binding or dicta. See Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Backs Away From War Powers Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2010,  at 
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/us/politics/01legal.html.  The panel’s denial did not completely 
resolve the issue; while seven of  the nine panel judges concurred in a joint statement expressing their belief  that the 
statements in question were dicta, two judges separately concurred to claim that the statements were not dicta but in fact 
controlling law.  See id.
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partners.”65  Like Hamlily (and to a certain extent, Gherebi-XGJH%URZQTXDOLÀHGWKH2EDPDDGPLQ-
istration’s substantial support standard, drawing heavily upon the 2006 MCA and its 2009 amend-
ments.66-XGJH%URZQMXVWLÀHGKHUDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKH0&$WRWKHUHDOPRI PLOLWDU\GHWHQWLRQVLQ
that “the government’s detention authority logically covers a category of  persons no narrower than 
is covered by its military commission authority.”67  The result is a standard that has been described 
by its critics as entirely too broad,68 but despite its arguably limitless scope, Al-Bihani’s interpreta-
tion of  the substantial support standard is now binding law in all habeas petitions heard by the D.C. 
District and D.C. Circuit Courts.69
C.  Vitiation—Once a Terrorist, Always a Terrorist?
Once the D.C. District Court holds that the Al-Bihani criteria are met and the detention is justi-
ÀHGIRUDSDUWLFXODUWHUURULVWVXVSHFWFDQWKDWVWDWXVHYHUEHYLWLDWHG"3XWDQRWKHUZD\´LVHOLJLELOLW\
for detention indelible in the sense that having once been a member or supporter of  these groups, 
one can always be detained?”70,I WKHDQVZHULV´\HVµDQGFDWHJRULFDOLQGHÀQLWHGHWHQWLRQLVFRP-
pelled by satisfaction of  the Al-BihaniFULWHULDZKDWLVWKHOHJDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKDWSRVLWLRQ",I QRW
DQGYLWLDWLRQLVSRVVLEOHZKDWVKRXOGWKHWHVWEHDQGZKDWLVWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKDWWHVW"
The issue of  vitiation has arisen in many detention cases, and D.C. District Court judges have 
taken “notably different positions on it.”71  After analyzing each of  these positions, and comparing 
them to the controlling law as held by the D.C. Circuit Court, this Article will then propose a differ-
ent standard.
1.  Initial Interpretations by the D.C. District Court
In Basardh v. Obama,72 D.C. District Court Judge Huvelle held that vitiation is possible, and 
depended on the “current likelihood of  [the detainee] rejoining the enemy.”73  Judge Huvelle did 
65  Al-Bihani)GDW $´O%LKDQLLVODZIXOO\GHWDLQHGZKHWKHUWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI DGHWDLQDEOHSHUVRQLVDVWKH
GLVWULFWFRXUWDUWLFXODWHGLW¶DQLQGLYLGXDOZKRZDVSDUWRI RUVXSSRUWLQJ7DOLEDQRUDO4DHGDIRUFHV·RUWKHPRGLÀHG
version offered by the government that requires that an individual ‘substantially support’ enemy forces.”).
66  See id. (“But for this case, it is enough to recognize that any person subject to a military commission trial [per the 
2006 MCA and 2009 amendments] is also subject to detention, and that category of  persons includes those who are 
part of  forces associated with [a]l Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces in 
hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.”).
67  Id.
68  See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 392 (noting that while the “Court’s ruling was consistent with the [Gherebi and 
Hamlily models, the Al-Bihani Court] issued dicta that went well beyond the principles of  this membership model”).
69  See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (claiming that the Al-Bihani standard governs who can 
be detained by the government under the AUMF).
70  Wittes, supra note 19, at 23.
71  Id.
72  612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009).
73  Id. at 35.
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not take into account what had occurred prior to Basardh’s detention,74 but rather focused solely on 
what events, if  any, occurred after his detention that could have some impact on the continued legal-
ity of  that detention.75  The government had encouraged Basardh to cooperate,76 and he complied,77
to the extent that his fellow detainees repeatedly threatened to kill him.78  Basardh also said he felt 
unsafe returning to his homeland and wanted instead to gain asylum in the United States, and even 
join the U.S. military.79  Judge Huvelle held that the AUMF, on which the Obama administration ex-
clusively relies for detention authority, does not authorize detention “beyond that which is necessary 
to prevent [detainees] from rejoining the battle,”80 and argued that Hamdi supported that interpreta-
tion.81  Judge Huvelle stated that “Basardh’s current likelihood of  rejoining the enemy is relevant to 
ZKHWKHUKLVFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGXQGHUWKHODZµ82 and that in this context, the court must 
consider “evidence relating to whether the detainee is no longer a threat.”83  Judge Huvelle found 
that evidence illustrated that Basardh was no longer a threat to the United States, and therefore, the 
$80)QRORQJHUMXVWLÀHG%DVDUGK·VGHWHQWLRQ84
In Awad v. Obama85 and Anam v. Obama,86 D.C. District Court Judges Robertson and Hogan 
adopted a stricter approach, holding that vitiation is not possible if  the detainee everVDWLVÀHGWKHFUL-
74  Id. at 31 (noting that “petitioner’s activities prior to his detention at Guantanamo . . . are not at issue here”).
75  See id. (“Rather, the only issue before the Court is a narrow one—what, if  any, relevance does Basardh’s [behavior 
after detention] have to a determination of  the lawlessness of  his continued detention?”).
76  Id. at 32 (“In addition, throughout this period [redacted] the government has encouraged [Basardh’s cooperation]. 
. . . [and] advised the detainee that in making its determination whether [he] could be released or transferred, the 
[government would] ‘consider . . . if  [he was] working with the United States government trying to help.”).
77  See id. (“Basardh ‘cooperated his entire stay while [at Guantanamo].’”); Del Quentin Wilber, Detainee-Informer Presents 
Quandary for Government, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/02/02/AR2009020203337.html (“In dozens of  interviews over several years at [Guantanamo Bay] . . . 
Yasim Muhammad Basardh provided the evidence needed to continue detaining scores of  alleged terrorists, military 
and FBI records show. . . . [I]t didn’t take long for Basardh to begin identifying others who trained at [the] al-Farooq [al-
Qaeda training camp], stayed at Taliban or al-Qaeda guest houses, protected bin Laden, or fought at Tora Bora.”).  
78  See 612 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (noting that the detainee “‘was beaten by other Detainees who believe he is a spy’ and 
‘was threatened many times to be killed by other Detainees’”); see also Wilber, supra note 77 (“Basardh is a well-known 
informer among the other detainees at the prison.”).
79  Wilber, supra note 77 (“He wants asylum in the United States and a chance to join the U.S military.”).
80  Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
81  Id.
82  Id. at 35.
83  Id.
84  See id. (“[T]he court concludes that the government has failed to meet its burden of  establishing that Basardh’s 
continued detention is authorized under the AUMF’s directive that such force be used ‘in order to prevent future acts of  
international terrorism’ . . . [t]he undisputed facts establish that Basardh’s [redacted] is known to the world, and thus, any 
ties with the enemy have been severed, and any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed . . . his 
continued detention lacks a basis in fact as well as in law.”).
85  646 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009).
86  696 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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WHULDIRUGHWHQWLRQDQGDVWDWXWRULO\DXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWLVVWLOOXQGHUZD\87  In Awad, Judge Robertson 
found that Awad was more likely than not part of  al Qaeda for some period of  time, but declined 
to even consider whether his continued detention was in any way related to his current threat to the 
United States.88  Despite the fact that Judge Robertson acknowledged that it was “ludicrous” to think 
Awad still posed a security threat to the United States, he declined to address that consideration, 
basing his position on Hamdi’s holding that the President’s detention authority existed until the end 
RI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFW89  Judge Hogan similarly refused the possibility of  vitiation in Anam,90 even 
DIWHUÀQGLQJWKDW$QDPGLGQRWSRVHDWKUHDWWRWKHVHFXULW\RI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV91  Again, Judge 
Hogan relied on Hamdi in holding that the President had the authority to detain for the duration of  
WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFW92DQGJLYHQWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWZDVVWLOORQJRLQJ´WKHFRXUW·VKDQGV>ZHUH@
tied.”93
While Anam, Awad, and Basardh all explore whether vitiation is possible based on events after
capture, Al Ginco v. Obama94 explores the separate question of  whether detention can be vitiated if  
the terrorist relationship does not exist up until the moment of  capture.95  In Al Ginco, the detainee 
had visited an al Qaeda camp, but then fell out of  favor with al Qaeda and was subsequently tor-
tured and imprisoned.96  U.S. forces then took Al Ginco into custody.97-XGJH/HRQÀUVWKHOGWKDW
vitiation, in some capacity, is absolutely available to detainees.98  He offered a factor-based test to 
GHWHUPLQHLI YLWLDWLRQLVMXVWLÀDEOHLQDJLYHQFDVHRULQRWKHUZRUGV´ZKHWKHUDSUHH[LVWLQJ>WHUURU-
87  See id. at 4 (concluding that because the detainee had met the standards for detention, the “Court’s hands are tied”); 
Awad)6XSSGDWQRWLQJWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFDQEHKHOGIRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWDFFRUGLQJWRHamdi and the 
AUMF).
88  646 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 27 (declining to consider “whether or to what extent the continued detention of  Awad 
supports the AUMF’s self-stated purpose of  ‘prevent[ing] . . . future acts of  international terrorism’. . .”).
89  Id.
90  See Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (“Absent from the above framework is mention of  the threat the individual poses to 
the national security of  the United States. Though recognizing its normative appeal, the Court declines to adopt in this 
case Judge Ellen S. Huvelle’s conclusion in [Basardh] . . . .”).
91  Id. (describing, at length, how Anam does not pose a threat to the United States). 
92  See id. at 4 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)) (noting that “[u]nder the AUMF, the President 
SRVVHVVHV´WKHDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQIRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWEDVHGRQORQJVWDQGLQJODZRIZDU
principles”).
93  Id.
94  626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009).
95  See id. at 130 (noting that “the conclusion is inescapable that [Al Ginco’s] pre-existing relationship, such as it was, 
ZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGDRUWKH7DOLEDQDWWKHWLPHKHZDVWDNHQLQWRFXVWRG\
.”).
96  Id. at 127.
97  Id.
98  See id.DW´%\WDNLQJDSRVLWLRQWKDWGHÀHVFRPPRQVHQVHWKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUFHVWKLVFRXUWWRDGGUHVVDQ
issue novel to these habeas proceedings:  whether a prior relationship between a detainee and al Qaeda (or the Taliban) 
FDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVRUERWKVXFKWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFRXOGQRORQJHU
be considered to be ‘part of ’ either organization at the time he was taken into custody.  The answer, of  course, is yes.”)
(emphasis added).
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ist] relationship has eroded over time.”99  Judge Leon implied that, to be a valid detention, the illicit 
terrorist relationship must have continued up until the moment of  capture.100  He held that because 
of  the “extraordinary intervening events”101 present in Al Ginco’s case, the AUMF did not support 
Al Ginco’s detention at the time of  his capture.  The D.C. District Court has since applied this ap-
proach.102
2. D.C. Circuit Interpretation
a. The Current Standard
The D.C. Circuit Court has indicated, in Al-Bihani and Awad, 103 its preference for the harder-line 
approach outlined by D.C. District Court Judges Robertson and Hogan in Awad and Anam.
Synthesis of  the D.C. Circuit Court opinions in Al-Bihani and Awad illustrates the current stan-
dard, which basically provides that if  the Al-Bihani test for detention is met, and authorized hostili-
ties are ongoing, vitiation is impossible.104  The standard therefore parallels the hard line, narrow ap-
proaches espoused by Judges Robertson and Hogan, and gives little credence at all to the arguments 
presented by Judges Huvelle and Leon.105  In Al-Bihani, Judge Brown, writing for the court, accepted 
that the government initially had authority to detain Al-Bihani, and held that absent a determination 
E\WKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHVWKDWKRVWLOLWLHVKDGFHDVHG$O%LKDQL·VFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQZDVMXVWLÀHG
99 Id.DW´>7@RGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDSUHH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVXIÀFLHQWO\HURGHGRYHUDVXVWDLQHGSHULRGRI WLPH
WKH&RXUWPXVWDWDPLQLPXPORRNWRWKHIROORZLQJIDFWRUVWKHQDWXUHRI WKHUHODWLRQVKLSLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFH
the nature of  intervening events or conduct; and (3) the amount of  time that has passed between the time of  the pres-
existing relationship and the point in time at which the detainee is taken into custody.”).
100 See id. at 130 (“[T]he conclusion is inescapable that [Al Ginco’s] pre-existing relationship, such as it was, was 
VXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGDRUWKH7DOLEDQDWWKHWLPHKHZDVWDNHQLQWRFXVWRG\    WKH
[g]overnment has [therefore] failed to establish by a preponderance of  the evidence that [he] was lawfully detainable . . . 
under the AUMF at the time he was taken into custody.”).
101 Id. at 127.
102 See Khalifh v. Obama, No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (applying Al Ginco WRÀQG
that a detainee “who may once have been part of  al-Qaida or the Taliban can show that he was no longer part of  such 
DQHQWLW\DWWKHWLPHRI FDSWXUHE\VKRZLQJWKDWKHWRRNDIÀUPDWLYHDFWLRQVWRDEDQGRQKLVPHPEHUVKLSµ
103  608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–75 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Al-Bihani’s connections “render 
him detainable” pursuant to the standard for detention, and that “in the absence of  a determination by the political 
EUDQFKHVWKDWKRVWLOLWLHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQKDYHHQGHG$O%LKDQL·VFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGµAwad, 608 F.3d at 11 
(noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’ authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on 
whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if  released but rather upon the continuation 
of  hostilities”). 
105 Compare Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the detainee can be held for the 
GXUDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWDFFRUGLQJWRHamdi and the AUMF), and Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(concluding that because the detainee had met the standards for detention, the “courts hands are tied”), with Basardh v. 
Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the AUMF only authorizes preventative detention and must 
take into account the threat posed by the detainee), and Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (noting that a prior terrorist 
UHODWLRQVKLSFDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHRULQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVVRWKDWWKHGHWDLQHH´FRXOGQR
longer be considered to be ‘part of ’ [al Qaeda] at the time he was taken into custody”).
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under law.106  Similarly, in Awad-XGJH6HQWHOOH·VRSLQLRQIRUWKHFRXUWDIÀUPHG-XGJH5REHUWVRQ·V
claim that governmental authority to detain Awad was dependent on the continuation of  hostilities, 
not the threat posed by the detainee.107  Judge Sentelle noted that Al-Bihani had foreclosed the ques-
tion of  whether vitiation is possible if  the detainee poses no current threat to the United States if  
released, concluding that “whether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if  released is not 
at issue in habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts concerning aliens detained under the author-
ity conferred by the AUMF.”108
b. Legal Support for Current Standard
D.C. Circuit Court Judges Brown and Sentelle, as well as D.C. District Court Judges Robert-
son and Hogan, rely on the interplay between the AUMF and the law of  war, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in HamdiWRÀQGWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWKDVWKHDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQSRWHQWLDOWHUURULVWVIRU
WKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHDXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFW*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJWKHUHDVRQLQJIROORZVDVLPLODUSDWWHUQ
the AUMF is valid, and Hamdi interpreted the AUMF to authorize detention for the duration of  the 
DXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWEDVHGRQWKHODZVRI ZDU109
As mentioned earlier, HamdiKHOGWKDWWKH$80)MXVWLÀHGWKHGHWHQWLRQRI SRVVLEOHWHUURULVWV
IRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFW110  This holding is widely accepted.111  At the District Court level, 
Judge Hogan applied Hamdi in AnamWRKROGWKDWEHFDXVHWKHDXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWZDVQRWRYHU´WKH
court’s hands are tied.”112  Similarly, Judge Robertson held in AwadWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ
continues, and thus, the President still has detention authority.113  At the Circuit Court level, Judges 
Brown and Sentelle cited Hamdi in similar fashion in Al Bihani and Awad, emphasizing that the exis-
WHQFHRI WKHFRQÁLFWVLPSO\SUHFOXGHGYLWLDWLRQ114
106  590 F.3d 866, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
107  608 F.3d at 8.
108 Id. at 18–19 (emphasis added).
109  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“If  the record establishes that U.S. troops are still involved in active 
combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of  the exercise of  ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ and therefore are 
authorized by the AUMF.”); see id. at 520 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 
118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135) (explaining that “[p]risoners of  war shall be released and repatriated 
without delay after the cessation of  active hostilities”).
110 Id. at 521 (“If  the record establishes that U.S. troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those 
detentions are part of  the exercise of  ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.”).
111 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 396 (noting that “the plurality of  the Supreme Court in Hamdi understood 
‘Congress’ grant of  authority for the use of  ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the 
GXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWµ
112  Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
113  646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hamdi 542 U.S. at 520).
114 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“With the government’s detention authority 
established as an initial matter, we turn to the argument that Al-Bihani must now be released according to longstanding 
ODZRI ZDUSULQFLSOHVEHFDXVHWKHFRQÁLFWZLWKWKH7DOLEDQKDVDOOHJHGO\HQGHGµAwad, 608 F.3d at 3 (“[I]n pursuit of  
this campaign and in other parts of  the world, still acting under the AUMF, the United States has captured and detained 
members of  the enemy force.”).
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Judge Brown also cited the laws of  war in reaching her conclusion regarding vitiation in Al-
Bihani.115  This is no surprise, given that the Supreme Court in Hamdi expressly articulated that its 
holding was based on longstanding law of  war principles.116  The laws of  war are seemingly succinct 
on the question of  vitiation, with the Third Geneva Convention stating that “prisoners shall be re-
leased and repatriated without delay after the cessation of  active hostilities.”117  In Al-Bihani, Judge Brown 
consequently held that the Geneva Conventions only require release and repatriation of  prisoners 
following the end of  hostilities.118
III.  PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH
A. Philosophical Shortcomings of  the Current Standard
On a philosophical level, it does not make sense to ignore the current threat posed by OCO 
detainees.  Professor Tung Yin has written that “continuing to detain persons who are no longer 
threats to the United States is undesirable and is unlikely to persuade the rest of  the world of  our 
good intentions.”119,QDJOREDOFRQÁLFWLQZKLFKZLQQLQJKHDUWVDQGPLQGVVHUYHVVXFKDSDUDPRXQW
concern, the current standard does not promote that end.   
0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKHJHQHVLVRI WKHFXUUHQWVWDQGDUGGRHVQRWUHÁHFWWKHOHJDOOHHZD\HQMR\HG
by the D.C. District Court in the post-Boumediene world.  When one reads Judge Hogan’s conclusion 
in Anam that his “hands are tied” on the question of  vitiation,120 despite the fact that the detainee in 
question did not pose a current threat to the United States,121LWLVGLIÀFXOWWREHOLHYHWKDWWKHFRXUW
on which he sits had been given the opportunity to set the very standards he claims he was prohib-
ited from modifying.122  Indeed, despite what Judge Hogan said in Anam, academics have largely 
115 See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
116 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 520 (2004) (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135) (holding that “[p]risoners of  war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of  active hostilities”).
117  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (emphasis added).
118  590 F.3d at 874 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
119 Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: a Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing 
Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 150 (2005).
120  Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
121 Id.
122 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of  the [procedural] 
issues that will arise during the course of  the detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings . . . these and the other remaining 
TXHVWLRQVDUHZLWKLQWKHH[SHUWLVHDQGFRPSHWHQFHRI WKH'LVWULFW&RXUWWRDGGUHVVLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFHµid. at 798 
(“The cases are remanded to the Court of  Appeals with instructions that it remand the cases to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
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interpreted Boumediene as affording the D.C. District Court a tremendous amount of  judicial power.123
Boumediene invited the presiding judges to step outside of  their normal comfort zone of  judicial 
restraint and to function not only as judges, but also as policy-makers.124  Furthermore, the Obama 
administration had all but validated such a role for the court,125 despite considerable anticipation that 
it might pursue a legislative solution.126
The vast leeway afforded to the D.C. District Court, indeed the tremendous opportunity provid-
ed to it by Boumediene and the administration’s deference on the issue, is best illustrated in Basardh.127
There, Judge Huvelle used statutory analysis to determine the breadth of  U.S. detention authority,128
and then departed from her fellow District Court judges to establish a creative and fair vitiation stan-
dard to apply to Guantanamo habeas petitions.129 Basardh shows the wide judicial and interpretive 
URRPWKHFRXUWKDGWRRSHUDWHDQGLOOXVWUDWHVWKHÁDZVLQKHUHQWLQ-XGJH+RJDQ·V´KDQGVDUHWLHGµ
metaphor.130
Instead of  taking the opportunity to offer creative legal solutions that take into account our 
national security responsibilities, while providing detainees with the ability to argue for vitiation, 
123  See Azmy, supra note 3, at 537 (describing Boumediene as a “largely unlimited invitation to the lower courts to 
create a whole new corpus of  habeas law in the context of  military detention”); Pogge, supra note 4, at 1078 (describing 
Boumediene as issuing a “mandate to design procedures for the Guantanamo detention proceedings”); id. at 1080 
(“Boumediene elevated the district courts to sit at the head of  the table.  The D.C. District did not voluntarily position 
itself  in the mist of  habeas commotion.  Rather, its authority over the disposition of  these petitions was essentially 
sealed by the Supreme Court’s majority in Boumediene, who advocated for consolidating the habeas petitions within 
the D.C. District . . . but although the Supreme Court made clear that the D.C. District Court would be the venue of  
choice, its recommendations for how to arrange the proceedings were, to say the least, wanting.”); see also Judith Resnick, 
Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 632 (2010) (describing the “core premise” of  
Boumediene as being that “that courts play[] a critical role by standing between individuals and the Executive”).
124  See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096 (stating that “Boumediene’s call for the D.C. District to take the reins of  all habeas 
petitions constitutes a qualitatively different type of  judicial intervention . . . the judges in this context are functioning 
QRWMXVWLQWKHLUQRUPDOFDSDFLW\DVIDFWÀQGHUVEXWDOVRDVSROLF\PDNHUVµ
125  See Wittes, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the administration’s position “means that for good or ill, these rules will 
be written by judges through the common-law process of  litigating the habeas corpus cases of  the . . . detainees still held 
at Guantanamo”).
126  See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 
2009) (“We must have clear, defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category.  We must have fair 
procedures so that we don’t make mistakes.  We must have a thorough process of  periodic review so that any prolonged 
GHWHQWLRQLVFDUHIXOO\HYDOXDWHGDQGMXVWLÀHGDQGVRJRLQJIRUZDUGmy administration will work with Congress to develop an 
appropriate legal regime.”) (emphasis added).
127  See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1094 (“Contrasting Leon’s steady, conservative [opinion in Al Ginco] with Huvelle’s 
evolving, pro-petitioner [opinion in Basardh] demonstrates the amount of  discretion available to district judges.”).
128  See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the AUMF “requires some nexus 
between the force (i.e., detention) and its purpose (i.e., preventing an enemy from rejoining the enemy to commit future 
hostile acts) . . . the AUMF does not authorize the detention of  individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent 
those individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can 
no longer be attained”).
129  See id. at 34–35 (establishing an individualized assessment of  dangerousness to determine if  detention is 
statutorily authorized).
130  Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
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the D.C. Circuit Court has instead chosen to foreclose the possibility of  vitiation.131  The court has 
done so despite the fact that the Obama administration is on the record as indicating that it believes 
vitiation is possible.132  On a legal level, the D.C. Circuit Court’s current approach is questionable.  
Indeed, the same authorities cited in support of  the current standard not only undermine that stan-
dard, but arguably support a new standard altogether.  
B.  A New Approach
7KHSURSHUVWDQGDUGVKRXOGDOORZIRUYLWLDWLRQHYHQLI DQRQJRLQJDXWKRUL]HGPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFW
H[LVWV0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\WKHVWDQGDUGVKRXOGIRFXVRQWKHSUHVHQWWKUHDWSRVHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
by the detainee,133 drawing on the reasoning of  Al Ginco and Basardh:  if  the detainee either did not 
present a threat at the time of  capture, or does not constitute a current threat, the detention should 
be vitiated.134
Both Al Ginco and BasardhDUHSUHGLFDWHGRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWGHWHQWLRQVKRXOGUHÁHFWWKHFXU-
rent threat posed by the detainee.135  In Al Ginco, that notion manifested in the idea that the detainee 
still had to maintain the terrorist relationship up until the time of  capture; if  he did not satisfy the 
criteria for detention at the time of  capture, he certainly did not pose a current threat and could not 
be detained.136  In Basardh, Judge Huvelle went one step further, arguing that even if  the terrorist 
relationship existed at the time of  capture, if  the detainee presently did not pose a threat, detention 
131 See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’ 
authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United 
States or its allies if  released but rather upon the continuation of  hostilities”).
132 See$O*LQFRY2EDPD)6XSSGQ''&FLWLQJ&ODVVLÀHG7UDQVFULSWRI 2UDO
Argument at 39, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123) (“[W]e are not saying once a Taliban, always a Taliban”) (noting that “[h]appily, 
the Government, to its credit, does not go so far as to contend that any prior relationship with al Qaeda or the Taliban, 
KRZHYHUGLVWDQWLQWKHSDVWDQGUHJDUGOHVVRI LQWHUYHQLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHVLVDVXIÀFLHQWEDVLVWRKROGDQLQGLYLGXDOXQGHU
$80)LQGHÀQLWHO\µ
133 See&XUWLV$%UDGOH\	-DFN/*ROGVPLWKCongressional Authority and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2048, 2125 (2005) (advocating for a framework that evaluates detainees “in individual rather than group-based terms); 
Yin, supra note 119, at 199 (recommending that continued detention should depend “on the government’s ability to 
demonstrate the detainee’s dangerousness”); Mortlock, supra note 27, at 375–76 (proposing a “membership model” to 
determine, on an individual basis, who falls under the government’s authority to detain). 
134 See Al Ginco)6XSSGDWKROGLQJWKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHU·VDIÀOLDWLRQZLWKDO4DHGD´ZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\
vitiated” at the time of  capture that he was not detainable under the AUMF); Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (stating that 
“the AUMF does not authorize the detention of  individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals 
from rejoining the battle . . . .”).  Contra Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’ 
authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United 
States or its allies if  released but rather upon the continuation of  hostilities”).
135 See infra notes 136-37.
136 See 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (noting the possibility that a “prior relationship between a detainee and al Qaeda (or the 
7DOLEDQFDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVRUERWKVXFKWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFRXOGQR
longer be considered to be ‘part of ’ either organization at the time of  his capture”).
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should be vitiated.137  As described below, a standard synthesizing these two principles is predicated 
upon sound legal arguments.
C.  Legal Foundation of  New Approach
State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has articulated the administration’s assertion of  
detention authority as being founded on the AUMF, “as informed by the principles of  the laws of  
war.”138  This echoes the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts’ treatment of  the issue, as well as that 
of  the Supreme Court in Hamdi.  However, not only do the laws of  war and the AUMF not support 
the current standard, they instead expressly support the type of  new approach outlined above.139
Put simply, both the AUMF and laws of  war justify only preventative detention.140 If  the government 
detains an individual who does not pose a threat to the United States, the detention is not preventa-
WLYHDQGWKHUHIRUHQRWVWDWXWRULO\MXVWLÀHG
1. AUMF
The AUMF is the exclusive source of  statutory authority cited by the current administration to 
detain potential terrorists.141  While the statute’s purpose certainly had a retaliatory component,142
scholars generally conclude that its fundamental purpose today is to prevent future terrorist at-
tacks.143  This purpose is evident in the text144 and was expressly verbalized by President Bush when 
he signed it into law.145  Even Judge Robertson, an outspoken proponent of  the current standard, 
acknowledges that the AUMF’s “self-stated” purpose is to prevent future terrorist attacks.146  The 
AUMF “requires some nexus between the force (i.e. detention) and its purpose (i.e. preventing indi-
137 See Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (holding that the AUMF compels the court to consider whether the detainee 
presently poses a threat to the United States).
138 Crook, supra note 25, at 275.
139 See infra Parts III.C.1–2.
140 See id.
141 See Baker, supra note 21 (“The Obama administration . . . will instead rely only [the AUMF] to continue to detain 
SHRSOHLQGHÀQLWHO\DQGZLWKRXWFKDUJHµ
142 See AUMF (authorizing the United States to “exercise its right to self-defense” and “use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons . . . [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”).
143 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 378 (citing AUMF) (noting that the AUMF’s purpose is to “prevent any future acts 
of  international terrorism against the United States” and that “this short passage subsequently became the legal basis 
. . . to detain members of  al-Qaeda”); Resnick, supra note 123, at 604 (stating that the AUMF authorizes “preventative 
detention”).
144 See AUMF (noting that the bill’s purpose is to “prevent any future acts of  international terrorism against the 
United States”).
145 See3UHVV5HOHDVH:KLWH+RXVH2IÀFHRI WKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\3UHVLGHQW6LJQV$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 
Military Force Bill (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
print/20010918-10.html (stating that the bill recognizes “the authority of  the President under the Constitution to . . . 
prevent acts of  terrorism against the United States”).
146  Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C 2009).
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viduals from rejoining the enemy to commit future hostile acts).”147
,WIROORZVWKDWLI WKHGHWDLQHHGRHVQRWSRVHDWKUHDWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRUPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\LI 
he will not rejoin the terrorist group to which he previously had ties, then the AUMF does not jus-
tify his detention.  This was the general pattern of  reasoning applied by Judge Huvelle in Basardh.148
&ULWLFDOWRKHUUHDVRQLQJZDVKHUÀQGLQJWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH$80)WKHOLNHOLKRRGRI DQLQGLYLG-
ual rejoining the enemy was relevant to the legality of  further detention.149  Finding that extenuating 
circumstances in Basardh’s case made it impossible for him to rejoin al Qaeda, Judge Huvelle held 
WKDWYLWLDWLRQZDVMXVWLÀHG150  Judge Leon in Al Ginco IROORZHGDVLPLODUURXWHÀQGLQJWKDWFLUFXP-
stances in between Al Ginco’s terrorist ties and the time of  his detention showed that he was not a 
threat at the time of  his capture and therefore did not currently pose a threat.  Thus, the AUMF did 
not authorize his detention.151
2.  Laws of  War
*LYHQWKDWWKHODZVRI ZDU´LQIRUPµWKH$80)·VMXVWLÀFDWLRQRI 86GHWHQWLRQDXWKRULW\152
it is important to analyze the extent to which they support the current standard.  The laws of  war 
play such a critical and prominent role in this debate because of  Hamdi, which has been commonly 
understood to interpret the laws of  war and the AUMF as authorizing the United States to detain 
SULVRQHUV´IRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWµ153  Yet, this ruling was not as clear-cut as the 
supporters of  the current vitiation standard want it to be.  The Court in fact attached a critical quali-
ÀHUQRWLQJWKDWLI WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DSDUWLFXODUFRQÁLFWDUHPDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWIURP
WKRVHFRQÁLFWVXSRQZKLFKWKHODZVRI ZDUZHUHIRUPXODWHGDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHODZVRI ZDUPD\EH
unwarranted.154
Hamdi·VTXDOLÀFDWLRQDQG+DUROG.RK·VVWDWHPHQWSUHVHQWWKUHHNH\TXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH
laws of  war.  First, how binding are the laws of  war on our detention authority?  Second, if  the laws 
RI ZDUDUHFRQWUROOLQJLQDQ\ZD\GRWKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWPDQGDWH
147  Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009).
148  See id. at 35 (holding that the detainee must be released because “the undisputed facts establish that Basardh’s 
[redacted] is known to the world, and thus, any ties with the enemy have been severed, and any realistic risk that he could 
rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed”).
149  Id.
150  See id. (noting that “any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed”).
151  See Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (asserting that “the conclusion is inescapable that his 
SUHH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVXFKDVLWZDVZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGDRUWKH7DOLEDQ
at the time he was taken into custody . . . [a]ccordingly, the Government has failed to establish . . . that [the detainee] 
was lawfully detainable as an enemy combatant under the AUMF at the time he was taken into custody [and must be 
released]”).
152  Crook, supra note 25, at 275.
153  542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
154  Id.; see Azmy, supra note 3, at 510–11 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521) (noting that HamdiTXDOLÀHGWKDWLI ´¶WKH
SUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFW·UHYHDOWKHPVHOYHVWREHXQOLNHWKRVHZKLFKLQIRUPHGWKHFUHDWLRQRI WKHODZV
of  war, then this prior understanding may ‘unravel’. . .”). 
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their application, as stipulated by Hamdi?155  Third, assuming that the laws of  war are applicable and 
inform the contours of  our detention authority, what do they authorize?
a.  How binding are the laws of  war?
The laws of  war are not comprehensively binding on the United States in the arena of  deten-
tion law, but the Obama administration acknowledges that they inform the scope of  U.S. detention 
authority.156  The limit of  their control over U.S. detention authority is evident in Al-Bihani.  While 
Judge Brown stated that “international laws of  war are helpful to courts when identifying the general 
set of  war powers to which the AUMF speaks,” she then noted that “their lack of  controlling legal 
IRUFHDQGÀUPGHÀQLWLRQUHQGHUWKHLUXVHERWKLQDSSRVLWHDQGLQDGYLVDEOHZKHQFRXUWVVHHNWRGH-
termine the limits of  the President’s war powers.”157  As mentioned in section II.B., however, Judge 
Brown later went on to cite the laws of  war as broadly shaping the limits of  presidential war pow-
ers, reasoning that the Geneva Conventions allow the President to detain terrorist suspects for the 
GXUDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFW158  While the laws of  war then inform the extent of  U.S. detention authority 
under the AUMF, their judicial interpretation and application indicate how their precise impact is still 
unsettled.159
155  542 U.S. at 521.
156 See Bradley, supra note 133, at 2088–89 (noting how the laws of  war can “both give content to the powers that 
the AUMF confers on the President and provide boundaries on the scope of  Congress’s authorization”); Crook, supra
QRWHDWQRWLQJWKDW´ERWKLQRXULQWHUQDOGLVFXVVLRQVDERXWVSHFLÀF*XDQWDQDPRGHWDLQHHVDQGEHIRUHWKH
courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of  detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF as 
informed by the laws of  war”); Mortlock, supra note 27, at 382 (explaining that, “though not independently binding on 
the President, the [laws of  war] help inform where the limitations on detention should lie under the AUMF”).  Some 
scholars additionally argue that given the transnational nature of  international terrorism, international law should play 
more of  a controlling role in informing our detention authority.  See Resnick, supra note 123, at 579 (stating that “given 
the transnational nature of  the threats themselves . . . this arena of  law would seem to invite transnational judicial 
exchanges . . . [n]ot only do many countries grapple with terror, many (like the United States) have responded by 
detaining individuals preventatively”).
157 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  As mentioned above, the extent of  the law of  war’s 
controlling force is still subject to debate given the D.C. Circuit’s August 30, 2010 denial to rehear Al-Bihani en banc.  See 
supra note 64. 
158 See Al-Bihani. 590 F.3d at 874 (arguing that “the Geneva Conventions require release and repatriation only at the 
‘cessation of  active hostilities’. . . ”).  
159 See supra note 64 (describing recent D.C. Circuit panel’s denial of  a rehearing of  Al-Bihani and noting that while 
seven Judges joined in the denial, two concurred to disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the language in question 
was controlling (and not dicta)). 
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E'RWKH´SUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVµRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWZDUUDQWODZRI ZDUDSSOLFDELOLW\"
Assuming that the laws of  war inform the extent of  our detention authority under the AUMF, 
Hamdi·VTXDOLÀFDWLRQ160 opens the door to the separate argument that the practical circumstances161
of  the OCO preclude the comprehensive application of  the laws of  war.  Indeed, by qualifying its 
holding in this manner, HamdiLPSOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKH´FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWµPRGHORI 
GHWHQWLRQPD\QRWEHDSSURSULDWHIRURUDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFW162
The OCO is certainly different from the wars on which the framers of  the international laws of  
war relied when the laws were drafted, casting into doubt their seamless application in the current 
FRQÁLFW163:DUVRI WKDWHUDZHUHSULPDULO\WUDGLWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWVDPRQJVWDWHVDQGGLGQRWSLW
DVXSHUSRZHUDJDLQVWD´GLIIXVHGLIÀFXOWWRLGHQWLI\WHUURULVWHQHP\µ164  In the OCO, the “enemy 
LQWHUPLQJOHVZLWKFLYLOLDQVµDQG´WKHEDWWOHÀHOGODFNVDSUHFLVHJHRJUDSKLFORFDWLRQµ165  It is also dif-
ÀFXOW´WRFRQFHSWXDOL]HWKHHQGRI WKHFRQÁLFWµZKLFK´UDLVHVTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI 
traditional powers to detain and try the enemy.”1661XPHURXVFULWLFVKDYHDOVRSRLQWHGVSHFLÀFDOO\
WRWKHSUREOHPVRI DSSO\LQJWKH´FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWµGXUDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGWRWKH2&2167  Because 
of  these practical circumstances, Hamdi arguably supports the non-application of  the cessation of  
FRQÁLFWPRGHOWRWKH2&2
c.  What do the laws of  war authorize?
Yet, assuming that the laws of  war doDSSO\WRWKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWDQGLQIRUP86GHWHQWLRQ
160 See86DWQRWLQJWKDW´LI WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFWDUHHQWLUHO\XQOLNHWKRVHRI WKH
FRQÁLFWVWKDWKDYHLQIRUPHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI WKHODZRI ZDUWKHQWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJPD\XQUDYHOAzmy, supra
note 3, at 510–11 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521) (noting that HamdiTXDOLÀHGWKDWLI ´¶WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI 
DJLYHQFRQÁLFW·UHYHDOWKHPVHOYHVWREHXQOLNHWKRVHZKLFKLQIRUPHGWKHFUHDWLRQRI WKHODZVRI ZDUWKHQWKLVSULRU
understanding may ‘unravel’ . . .”).
161 542 U.S. at 521.
162 See id.QRWLQJWKDW´>L@I WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFWDUHHQWLUHO\XQOLNHWKRVHRI WKHFRQÁLFWV
that informed the development of  the law of  war, that understanding may unravel”).
163 See Yin, supra note 119, at 210–11 (explaining that “simply because military force might be reasonably directed 
DJDLQVWQRQVWDWHDFWRUVXQGHUGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLWGRHVQRWIROORZWKDWWKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWFDQEH
transferred seamlessly into the new context”).
164 Crook, supra note 25, at 275 (“Construing what is ‘necessary and appropriate’ under the AUMF requires some 
‘translation,’ or analogizing principles from the laws of  war governing traditional internationalFRQÁLFWVµsee Yin, supra
QRWHDWH[SODLQLQJWKDW´WKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRKDYHDQWLFLSDWHGWKH
use of  force against nonstate actors”).
165  Bradley, supra note 133, at 2048–49.
166 See id. 
167 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 396 (explaining that, due to the indeterminate length of  the OCO, “in the terrorism 
FRQWH[WWKLV>ODZRI ZDUFHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWGXUDWLRQDO@VWDQGDUGSURGXFHVDQH[WUHPHUHVXOWµ<LQsupra note 119, at 
189 (stressing that ´DZDURUPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFWZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRI GHIHDWLQJ¶WHUURULVP·LVDVPDQ\RWKHUKDYHQRWHG
of  potentially never-ending duration”); id. at 205–06 (arguing that “when military force is applied against nonstate actors 
VXFKDVDO4DHGDWKHFRQWLQXLQJH[LVWHQFHRI VXFKDQHQWLW\>IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFW@LVPXFKOHVVFOHDU
DVLVWKHDELOLW\RI VXFKHQWLW\WRQHJRWLDWHDQHQGWRWKHFRQÁLFWµ.
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authority therein, what do they actually authorize in the context of  vitiation?  In other words, under 
the international laws of  war, how long can the United States detain potential terrorists detained 
during the OCO?
While the laws of  war have been repeatedly cited to authorize detention for the duration of  
WKHFRQÁLFWUHJDUGOHVVRI WKHWKUHDWSRVHGE\WKHLQGLYLGXDOWKHLUOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQWKDVDOWHUQDWLYHO\
been interpreted to authorize only preventative detention.168  The most cited portion of  the laws of  
war in the context of  detention and vitiation is Article 118 of  the Third Geneva Convention, which 
states that prisoners “shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of  active 
hostilities.”169+RZHYHULQVWHDGRI LQWHQGLQJWRSURYLGHZDUULQJSDUWLHVZLWKWKHDELOLW\WRLQGHÀ-
nitely detain prisoners regardless of  their respective threat levels, some scholars believe that “the 
SXUSRVHRI >$UWLFOH@LVWRSUHYHQWHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVIURPUHWXUQLQJWRÀJKWµ 170  By detaining 
SULVRQHUVRI ZDUIRUWKHHQWLUHW\RI DFRQÁLFWDFRXQWU\SUHYHQWVWKHSULVRQHUVWKDWLWKROGVIURP
UHWXUQLQJWRWKHÀJKW171  Academics have interpreted HamdiDVFRQÀUPLQJWKLVFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ172
7KHUHIRUHLI WKHGHWHQWLRQGRHVQRWSURKLELWVRPHRQHIURPUHWXUQLQJWRWKHÀHOGRI EDWWOHWKHQ
the laws of  war do not authorize detention and the detainee must be released.173  If  a former mem-
EHURI DO4DHGDUHQRXQFHVKLVSUHYLRXVWHUURULVWWLHVDQGGHFLGHVWKDWKHQRORQJHUZDQWVWRÀJKW
against the United States, he is no longer dangerous and his detention status should be vitiated under 
the laws of  war.174  Such would be consistent with the spirit of  the laws of  war, which recognize 
the possibility that a detainee, who was once dangerous, may become harmless prior to cessation of  
hostilities.175
168  See Yin, supraQRWHDWQRWLQJWKDW´LQWKHFDVHRI WKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWZKLFKLVJRYHUQHGODUJHO\E\
the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, the harm justifying intervention includes 
potential of  future harm; detention of  enemy soldiers is based purely on preventative incapacitation grounds”); id. at 169 
(noting that the law of  war “allows detention of  enemy prisoners of  war solely to prevent them from engaging in further 
FRQÁLFWDJDLQVWWKHGHWDLQLQJVWDWHµ
169  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135.
170  Bradley, supra note 133, at 2123.
171  Yin, supra note 119, at 166; see Mortlock, supra note 27, at 382 (“Detention is intended to prevent enemy 
FRPEDWDQWVIURPUHWXUQLQJWRWKHEDWWOHÀHOGµ
172  See Azmy, supraQRWHDWQRWLQJWKDWLQGHÀQLQJ86GHWHQWLRQDXWKRULW\FRXUWVKDYHRIWHQFKDUDFWHUL]HG
“members of  al Qaeda and the Taliban [as] tantamount to uniformed members of  the ‘armed forces’ who the 
Government can target under the Geneva Conventions and, according to Hamdi, GHWDLQWRSUHYHQWUHWXUQWRWKHEDWWOHÀHOG”)
(emphasis added).
173  See Yin, supra note 119, at 169 (noting that “the underlying rationale of  [the Geneva Convention] is that enemy 
prisoners of  war who no longer pose any threat to the detaining State . . . should be repatriated”).
174  See id. at 206.
175  See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 401 (“Detainees who sincerely renounce their loyalty to al Qaeda and its goals no 
ORQJHUSUHVHQWDWKUHDWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV>D@FFRUGLQJO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVQRORQJHUKDVWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQLWRQFH
did to detain them.”).
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D. Who Should Set The Standard?
Having articulated a new standard to be applied in the context of  detention vitiation, a critical 
question remains: who should set this new standard?  Scholars seem divided on this issue.176  Many 
argue that the post-Boumediene common law process has shown itself  to be woefully unsuccessful 
LQHVWDEOLVKLQJFOHDUMXVWLÀDEOHOHJDOVWDQGDUGVWREHDSSOLHGLQGHWHQWLRQFDVHV177 Others argue that 
the federal court system is perfectly capable of  establishing such proper guidelines.178  This Article 
advocates the former position.
Those who contend that the federal court system should continue to set substantive and pro-
cedural standards in Guantanamo detention cases rely on three distinct arguments.1797KHÀUVWLV
straightforward: Hamdi and Boumediene establish the Supreme Court’s clear preference for the federal 
courts to play this role.180  One scholar, Judith Resnick, goes so far as to say that the Supreme Court 
cases provide a “constitutional mandate” for the Judiciary’s continued role in the incremental, com-
mon law creation of  post-Boumediene procedural standards.181  Second, from a separation of  powers 
standpoint, the federal courts can also, in this role, “meaningfully constrict the Executive’s expansive 
claims of  detention authority.”182
Third, scholars argue that the federal courts are well equipped to handle the challenge, and point 
to the progress that has already been made.1832QWKHÀUVWSRLQWZKLOHWKH*XDQWDQDPRFDVHVUDLVH
“challenging normative, political, and practical considerations,”184 it is argued that such challenges are 
within the “expertise and competence” of  the district courts.185  The issues raised by Guantanamo 
cases are far from “exotic”186 and are instead “continuous with judicial responses to the central chal-
lenges, faced daily, by governments trying to maintain peace and security and, hence, incapacitating 
VRPHLQGLYLGXDOVIHDUHGOLNHO\WRLQÁLFWJUDYHKDUPWRWKHVRFLDORUGHUµ187  In addition, many cite the 
176 See Resnick, supra note 123, at 586 (noting that “[t]he 9/11 case law has prompted diverse assessments, with 
arguments that the judiciary has done too much, or too little, or left unanswered important questions about the 
permissible scope of  executive detention and surveillance powers”).
177 See infra notes 191-197.
178 See infra notes 180-189.
179 See id.
180 See Azmy, supra note 3, at 537 (describing BoumedieneDVD´GHFUHHWKDWWKHFRXUWVZLOOKDYHDVLJQLÀFDQWUROHLQ
managing executive detention operations to ensure they comply with the most elementary constraints of  law”); id. at 450 
(celebrating Boumediene’s “historic judgment” that “defend[s] the Court’s asserted role as necessary and correct”).
181 Resnick, supra note 123, at 626; see id. at 625 (interpreting Hamdi as ´DZLVHSODFHKROGHUÀUPO\LQVLVWHQWRQDUROH
for the courts” in Guantanamo cases).
182 Azmy, supra note 3, at 499.
183 See infra notes 184-189.
184 Azmy, supra note 3, at 537.
185 Id.; see also Pogge, supra note 4, at 1094–95 (noting that judges are “skilled in procedural matters” and that “their 
experience in this area seems to make them the natural choice to be the creators of  the habeas procedures”).
186 Resnick, supra note 123, at 584; see also id. at 634 (noting that the “key elements that form the predicate for 9/11 
detention,” including “deciding who to detain, and dealing over long periods of  time with people determined to be 
HJUHJLRXVO\GDQJHURXVHYHQDVWKH\WRRDUHLQQHHGRI VDIHW\RUGLVFLSOLQHZKLOHFRQÀQHGµDUH´QRWVXLJHQHULVWR
but are variations on the core problems of  criminal law”).
187 Id. at 584. 
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progress made so far188 as “proving [that the courts are] amply equipped to resolve these cases and 
are competent to do so without interfering with core areas of  military discretion.”189
However, the arguments for a legislatively mandated standard are more compelling than the 
arguments articulated above.190  While the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts have certainly made 
some degree of  progress, in that they have issued rulings in a number of  Guantanamo cases, those 
rulings have presented what some describe as a “contradictory and incoherent body of  law.”191  As 
previously explained, the results at the District Court level, especially on the question of  vitiation, 
vary from judge to judge.192  Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit Court has recently adopted a standard 
that arguably lacks statutory authority.193  Some argue that Congress is better suited to act in the area 
of  national security,194 and it has furthermore shown the ability to expeditiously and appropriately 
intervene in such matters.195  In sum, the circumstances illustrate “strong evidence of  the need for 
legislative rules,”196 and a congressional standard similar to that proposed by this Article would instill 
RYHUDUFKLQJFODULW\ZKLOHDOORZLQJWKHFRXUWVWRDSSO\FDVHVSHFLÀFIDFWVWRUHDFKLQGLYLGXDOUXOLQJV197
IV.  CONCLUSION
The current standard for vitiation, as held and applied by the D.C. Circuit Court in Al-Bihani and 
Awad, provides that vitiation is impossible if  the criteria for detention have ever been met and the 
SHUWLQHQWFRQÁLFWLVRQJRLQJ198  In other words, as articulated by Judge Hogan, even if  the detainee 
188  See id. at 626 (emphasizing that the post-Boumediene D.C. District Court opinions “have shaped a common law of  
habeas corpus rights and remedies as, in dozens of  rulings, district and appellate judges mined the parameters of  lawful 
FRQÀQHPHQWIRUDOOHJHGHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVµ
189  Azmy, supra note 3, at 514–15. 
190  See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096 (noting that ´>W@KHVHSRWHQWLDOEHQHÀWV>RI DMXGLFLDOO\FUHDWHGVWDQGDUG@ZKHQ
weighed against [the alternative of  a legislative standard], do not ultimately justify a judicially dominated procedure-
shaping system”). 
191  Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes, No Place to Write Detention Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A19.
192  See Benjamin Wittes, Editorial, Obama’s Dick Cheney Moment, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2009, at A19 (noting that “the 
judges who have heard habeas cases have disagreed about a great many central issues”).
193  See supra Part III.C. 
194  See Benjamin Wittes, Obama Retreats on Creating a Better System for Detaining Suspected Terrorists, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 
2009, available at,
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/28/AR2009092802492.html (questioning whether 
it is “really better to hand this complex policy problem over to the whim of  [unelected judges] than to ask the legislature 
to decide when America is going to detain alleged terrorists, under what rules and with what rights”).
195  See Wittes, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that in the aftermath of  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Congress “soon 
UHVSRQGHGZLWKWKH'HWDLQHH7UHDWPHQW$FW'7$RI ZKLFKDWÀUVWEOXVKDSSHDUHGWRHOLPLQDWH>WKH@VWDWXWRU\
habeas jurisdiction [articulated in Rasul] in favor of  a potentially more limited form of  judicial review committed 
exclusively to the D.C. Circuit Court of  Appeals”).  
196  Id. at 7.
197  See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096-97 (arguing that a congressional standard would “create a more systematically 
balanced process” and ´LQVWLOOXQLIRUPLW\ZKLOHVWLOODOORZLQJMXGJHVÁH[LELOLW\LQDGMXGLFDWLQJVSHFLÀFSHWLWLRQHUV·
claims”).
198  See supra Part II.C. 
